Iraq Surge Costs American Lives

Here’s our latest monthly, highly abbreviated version of the Iraq Index, published and updated twice a week by Michael O'Hanlon of the Brookings Institution:



Americans Killed in Action, Iraq (monthly average)
2003: 32
2004: 59
2005: 56
2006: 58
2007: 78
April: 99

Americans Killed in Action, Vietnam (monthly average)
1965: 128*
1966: 420
1967: 767
1968: 1140
1969: 785
____
* = First U.S. combat troops arrived in Vietnam, 5.3.65
Vietnam table compiled by Galen Fox using Defense Department sources.

Crude Oil Production (m. bbls./day)

Prewar Peak: 2.50
Goal: 2.10 (Revised downward, 1/07)
actual: 2.14 (4/07)

Electricity (megawatts)

Prewar: 3,958
Goal: 6,000
actual: 4,000 (4/07)

Since our last monthly report, the American KIA total rose markedly from March's 75. The surge is costing American lives. Of the 99 KIA in April, 60 died as a result of improvised explosive devices or IED's, the second highest total for any month in Iraq (72 died that way in December 2006). [Please note: the number of KIA is almost always lower than the media-reported total of American deaths, which covers all causes, including non-hostile. Our Iraq and Vietnam figures are KIA only.]

Electricity output in April rose with the temperature, reaching to pre-war levels.

O’Hanlon has offered his evaluation of the surge’s success to date. Here, from that evaluation:

Iraqi political compromise remains very limited. All American officials including General David Petraeus underscore the degree to which the surge cannot succeed based on a narrow military logic. At best, it can create political space for compromise that has often proved elusive during Iraq's periods of most intensive violence. Unfortunately, there is little sign of progress along such lines to date. While the hydrocarbon law that would ensure fair sharing of oil revenues among all Iraqis has made some progress in its journey through parliament, little has happened over the last month, and the bill is still far from becoming law. Other areas where reconciliation and compromise are needed, such as reforming the de-Baathification process to allow lower-level Baathists to rejoin public life and compete again for jobs, are not showing much progress.