The Myths of Evan Thomas (Part II)

Evan Thomas links his effort to disparage the Munich lesson to David Halberstam, who did more than any other journalist to redirect U.S. policy on Vietnam. Halberstam in The Best and the Brightest called Munich’s lesson a misapplied justification for “interventionism” and “use of force.” Thomas agrees, rejecting the Munich “myth” and saying he likes presidents who “realize that the choice between negotiation and force is rarely clear-cut or either-or.”

In practice, however, Thomas revises history to honor negotiation above force.

 Thomas says Roosevelt praised Chamberlain at Munich and declared war on Germany only after Hitler acted first. In fact, FDR was eager to join Churchill in taking on Hitler, and more eager than Churchill to invade the continent.

 Thomas says Stalin had no designs on Western Europe after World War II. In fact, only strong action by Truman headed off Communist triumphs in Greece, Turkey, France, Italy, and West Berlin.

 Thomas says Communism’s conquest of China was simply an internal Chinese matter. In fact, Truman’s explicit decision to defend South Korea, Taiwan, and Indochina from Communism responded to the shock Americans felt when China went Communist on Truman’s watch.

 Thomas says Eisenhower “ludicrously. . . went to the brink” to protect Taiwan’s Quemoy and Matsu from Communist attack. In fact, Eisenhower’s action stopped an invasion that threatened Taiwan.

 Thomas says World War II conscientious objector Ted Sorensen wisely wrote the words in Kennedy’s inaugural, “Let us never negotiate out of fear, but let us never fear to negotiate.” In fact, Sorensen’s speech carried the words that led directly to Vietnam—“we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty.” (Here, Thomas fools only people younger than himself—Obama maybe?—we all remember how Kennedy’s speech ratcheted up the Cold War).

 Thomas says Kennedy stood up to the Soviets in divided Berlin. In fact, Khrushchev threw up the Berlin Wall shortly after meeting Kennedy in Vienna, and sizing him up as a weakling (see Obama, summit, first year, no preconditions).

 Thomas says Kennedy “shrewdly balanced force and diplomacy” during the Cuban missile crisis. In fact, Kennedy carried the world to the brink of nuclear holocaust, forcing Khrushchev into a public humiliation that cost him his job within two years. (When Khrushchev rashly sent missiles to Cuba, he acted after the president’s ill-prepared Vienna summit led Khrushchev to underestimate Kennedy’s nerve; see Obama, summit, first year, no preconditions.)

 Thomas says Kennedy negotiated a secret Cuban missile compromise similar to the “appeasement” Kennedy later charged Adlai Stevenson had advocated. In fact, Stevenson truly worried about war. In fact, the U.S. agreement to pull obsolete Jupiter missiles out of Turkey meant little; the missiles had no strategic significance, and the secrecy of their withdrawal protected Turkish face. In fact, Khrushchev had to back down because of an 8:1 U.S. advantage in strategic missiles—a fact Thomas knows but ignores.

The truth is, as Thomas writes, "The Kennedy's favorite word--and highest praise--was 'tough.'" Roosevelt was tough in war, Truman was tough in dealing with Communists, Eisenhower valued peace but was tough with China, Kennedy was tough. None were Evan Thomas-type presidents squeamish about using force. All believed "the Munich lesson" and all viewed "appeasement" as a dirty word.