Sunday, October 11, 2009

How Now Peace in Afghanistan?

how [are] the truly self-sacrificing professionals who are attempting to create a sound American policy on Afghanistan . . . going to experience this[?] “Hmm, can a president who just won the left's great peace prize decide to increase American troop strength and presence in a foreign war?”

--Peggy Noonan, 10.10.09


We struggle to get Afghanistan right. Do we follow the path of “peace through strength,” allowing the military to prevail the way they did in Iraq after the surge, as they did in Kosovo, in the Gulf War (1991), and as they might have in Vietnam, as Lewis Sorley argued in his book A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam, had the opposition at home not blocked their efforts?

Sorley’s 1999 book about Vietnam is must reading for military brass in the aftermath of the Iraq surge’s success—it shows counterinsurgency can work. But the White House political powers, including Vice President Biden, Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel, and the President himself, are reading a different book about Vietnam, Lessons in Disaster, Gordon Goldstein’s 2008 study of National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy and decision-making in the Kennedy and Johnson White Houses. As Goldstein’s title suggests, the book is about how bright men can make dumb decisions, especially when relying on military power. Obama, as we have said, doesn’t want to be another Johnson, Obama is president, and so Goldstein should win any “battle of the books” with Sorley.

Now does the Peace Prize make it even more likely Obama will overturn his generals’ advice and go for less—the same underfed force in Afghanistan that Bush and Rumsfeld’s “small footprint” unsuccessfully provided Iraq in 2003-06? What is this White House line about the Taliban not being al Qaeda, meaning we don’t have to defeat the Taliban, because they are Afghanistan nationalists, just as the enemy Kennedy-Johnson fought in the 1960s were Vietnamese nationalists? Take on al Qaeda in Pakistan with its worldwide ambitions, but ease off the Taliban, who are only local nationalists? Does this make sense, when the Taliban and al Qaeda, defined by their mutually militant Islamic practices, have worked together so closely over two decades?

What about Holbrooke [picture, top figure], the foreign policy dog fighter Obama has made responsible for Afghanistan and Pakistan? Is Holbrooke comfortable with this emerging strategy of downgrading the war against the Taliban, in the belief that we can just go after al Qaeda in Pakistan?

George Packer has a fantastic, detailed New Yorker profile of Holbrooke and his views. I find Packer’s article reassuring. Holbrooke wants to prevail over al Qaeda, Holbrooke knows how closely linked the Taliban is to al Qaeda, Holbrooke still believes in the “win their hearts and minds” counterinsurgency strategy we were unable to implement successfully in Vietnam but did in Iraq, and Holbrooke is the consummate bureaucratic infighter, especially skilled at winning in liberal Democratic administrations.

Obama still may go wobbly on Afghanistan-Pakistan, especially in the aftermath of his Peace Prize. But with Holbrooke, we have the best chance of being able to continue the fight that has real peace as its final goal.

2 comments:

Derek said...

Hi Dad,

Yes! Obviously, the way to get peace in Afghanistan is to send more troops and wage war more aggressively.

It is partly because Obama is disinclined to accept this sort of facile reasoning, no matter how "muscularly" argued, that he has become the world's greatest hope for peace.

Aloha,
Derek

Galen Fox said...

Thank you for your comment.

Actually, as one observer noted, more troops lead to less killing, because by providing greater security, troops reduce the opportunity for violence. Would you fight crime by reducing the size of your local police force? No, you would not, though you would also want to provide jobs and better schools.

As for "wag[ing] war more aggressively," no. The point of counterinsurgency is to protect and win over the local population, which means less concentration on aggressive warfare, more attention to building up local infrastructure and helping people.

Unfortunately, counterinsurgency costs money; resources many would prefer to keep at home. I think the real issue is whether or not we view defeating al Qaeda as vital to our national security. If we do, we should probably accept the need to deny al Qaeda a base in Afghanistan, and commit the resources needed to achieve that objective.

Our ultimate objective is peace, though Norwegian Nobelists may not see it that way.